WASHINGTON'S JUVENILE STATUS OFFENSE LAWS

Juvenile status offense laws give courts authority over children's acts, like parental defiance and truancy, that have no
adult equivalents.' Rooted in archaic paternalism, these often
harsh, vague, and inequitable laws have been the subject of constitutional challenges2 and calls for their abolition.3 Although
some jurisdictions have modified their status offense laws in recent years,' all jurisdictions still retain authority over status offenders.5 The Washington State Legislature, in a broad revision
1. The term "status offense laws" derives from the fact that historically some of the
laws have punished a child's status or condition rather than specific behavior. A former
Washington statute, for example, defined as dependent a child "in danger of growing up
to lead an idle, dissolute or immoral life." Juvenile Court Law, ch. 160, § 1(16), 1913
Wash. Laws 520 (formerly codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(8) (1976)) (repealed
1977) (repeal effective July 1, 1978). The state could institutionalize all dependent children until the age of 21. Id. §§ 8, 10 (amended 1967). See note 54 infra.
As used in juvenile law literature and in this comment, "status offense laws" means
all juvenile legislation governing acts that are not criminal if adults commit them. See
Board of Directors, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Jurisdictionover Status
Offenses Should Be Removed from the Juvenile Court, 21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 97 (1975).
For a comprehensive analysis of the types and characteristics of status offense laws,
see Rosenberg & Rosenberg, The Legacy of the Stubborn and Rebellious Son, 74 MICH.
L. REv. 1097, 1098-1109 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash.2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975); In re Jackson,
6 Wash. App. 962, 497 P.2d 259 (1972).
3. See, e.g., JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, INSTITUTE 01 JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT-STANDARDS RELATING To NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as

STANDARDS]; Board of Directors, supra note 1; Gilman, How to Retain JurisdictionOver
Status Offenses, 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 48 (1976).
4. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 3101, 3103 (West Supp. 1965-1978)
(restricting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to acts, except for liquor and certain
marijuana and traffic violations, that would be criminal for adults); OR. REV. STAT. §
419.509(1) (1977) (prohibiting the institutional commitment of status offenders).
Federal funding incentives are spurring status offense reform. The Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109-43 (codified
in scattered sections of 5, 18, 42 U.S.C.), encourages alternatives to traditional juvenile
court practices. It provides, for example, that states must, within three years of soliciting
funds under the Act, cease placing status offenders in juvenile detention or correctional
facilities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (West Supp. 1978). Some states are resistant to
this provision. See Comment, The Status Offender and the Juvenile Court, 12 WI.LAMETrE
L.J. 557, 565 (1976).
5. ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 15-30 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(2) (Supp. 1977); Amiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-202(A) (West Supp. 1977-1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §45-406 (1977); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-104(1)(b) (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-59 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 921(1) (1975);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2316 (West. Supp. 1978-1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(1) (West
Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-301 (Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-11(2)(C), (D)
(1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1803(1) (Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-1 (SmithHurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-7.1 (Burns Supp. 1978); IowA CODE ANN. § 232.63
(West Supp. 1978-1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-806(a) (Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. §
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of its juvenile laws effective July 1, 1978,1 replaced the state's
status offense laws with procedures emphasizing voluntary social
services for rebellious children and their families.7 Reflecting
modem theories of child behavior, the new laws depart from traditional juvenile court philosophy and offer generally superior
solutions to the problem of unruly children. The legislature, however, also instituted a new status offense applicable if the voluntary procedures fail.8 Ambiguous and impractical, the legislation's new status offense represents a partial retention of the
harsh paternalism of past juvenile laws.
This comment discusses the history and characteristics of
traditional status offense laws, demonstrates why the laws are a
poor response to juvenile misbehavior, and examines proposals to
improve them. In subsequently analyzing the new Washington
laws, this comment concludes that the legislature, though implementing some of these proposals, failed to apply a consistently
progressive approach to its new legislation. Inadequate protection
for some children and inequitable application of provisions in the
new laws may result. Finally, this comment suggests ways to
improve the Washington legislation.
208.020(1)(b), (c) (1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1570A(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1978); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101 (West Supp. 1965-1978); MD. CTS. & Jun. PRoc. CODE ANN.
§ 3-804(a) (Supp. 1977); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39E (West Supp. 1978-1979);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(a)(2)-(6), (d)(1)-(6) (Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.111(1) (West 1971); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-7 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.031.1(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-1206(1) (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-205 (1974); NEv. REv. STAT. § 62.040.1(b) (1977); N.H. REv. STAT.
AN. § 169:3 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-46(a) (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14-9(2) (1953); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 713 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
7A-279 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-03.1(a) (1974); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
2151.23(A)(1) (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1102(A) (West Supp. 1977-1978);
OR. REv. STAT. § 419.476(1)(b), (c), (f) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-103(1) (Purdon
Supp. 1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-5(A)(2) (1969); S.C. CODE § 14-21-510(A)(1)(b),
(c) (1976); S.D. CO~niED LAWS ANN. § 26-7-1 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-203(a)(1)
(Supp. 1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 51.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978); UTAH COnE
ANN. § 78-3a-16(2) (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 633(a) (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 16.1241(A)(1) (Supp. 1978); WASH. REv. CODE § 13.04.030(2), (4) (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE
§ 49-5-7 (Supp. 1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.12(2)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Wyo.
STAT. § 14-8-104(a)(i) (1977).
6. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 13.04.005-.40.300, 28A.27.070, 74.13.031(3), (4) (Supp. 1977).

In addition to making the changes in the state's status offense laws that are the subject
of this comment, the Washington Legislature instituted a form of determinate sentencing
for juveniles who commit crimes and revised the grounds and procedures for termination
of parental rights over abandoned, abused, and neglected children. See Krajick, A Step
Toward Determinacy for Juveniles, CORRECTIONS, Sept., 1977, at 37; Comment,
Termination of ParentalRights in Washington, 2 U.P.S. L. REv. 155 (1978).
7. WASH. Rev. COnE §§ 13.30.010-.32.050, 28A.27.070, 74.13.031(3), (4) (Supp. 1977).
8. Id. § 13.34.030(2)(d). See text accompanying notes 118-52 infra.
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TRADITIONAL JUVENILE STATUS OFFENSE LAWS

Laws to control unruly children are an ancient idea that
found early and ultimately universal acceptance in this country.
Following the language of the Old Testament, 9 a 1625 colonial
Massachusetts law prescribed the death penalty for "a stubborn
and rebellious son. . . which will not obey the voice of his father
or the voice of his mother."' 0 By the nineteenth century, laws in
various jurisdictions permitted the institutionalization of
"incorrigible" children." In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many legislatures enacted lengthy statutes giving
the newly-established juvenile courts authority over many kinds
of juvenile misbehavior.' 2 Today, all United States jurisdictions
have status offense laws governing children's noncriminal misconduct.'
9. Deuteronomy 21:18 (King James).
10. See Sidman, The Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law: Law and Order in the
Home, 6 FAM. L.Q. 33, 42-43 (1972). A Massachusetts statute providing for six months of
incarceration and a fine for "stubborn children" was in effect until 1973. MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 53 (West 1970) (amended 1973).
11. See, e.g., Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839); S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE
AMERICAN DELINQUENT

27, 197 app. (1977). Schlossman describes the commitment of

"incorrigibles" to the New York City House of Refuge and the Wisconsin State Reform
School.
12. E.g., Act of Feb. 15, 1905, ch. 18, §§ 1, 7, 1905 Wash. Laws 34 (repealed 1909).
This legislation, establishing a special "juvenile court session" of the superior court,
permitted the institutionalization of a child under age 17
who is incorrigable [sic] or who knowingly associates or lives with thieves,
vicious, immoral or disreputable persons; oi who is growing up in idleness or
crime; or habitually begs or receives alms; or who is found living in any house
of ill fame; or who knowingly visits or enters a house of ill repute; or who
knowingly patronizes or visits any policy shop or place where any gambling
device is or shall be operated; or who patronizes or visits any saloon or dram
shop where intoxicating liquors are sold; or who patronizes or visits any public
pool room or bucket shop; or who wanders about the streets in the night time
without being on any lawful business or occupation; or who habitually wanders
about any railroad yards or tracks, or jumps or hooks onto any moving train, or
enters any car or engine without any lawful authority; or who habitually uses
vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language; or is guilty of immoral
conduct in any public place, or about any school house; and any child under
the age of eight years who is found peddling or selling any articles; or singing or
playing any musical instrument upon the street or giving any public entertainment.
Id. § 1. Previous Washington law included only three juvenile status offenses: incorrigibility, mendicancy, and vagrancy. Act of Mar. 7, 1891, ch. 103, § 1, 1891 Wash. Laws 195
(no longer in effect) (subsequent history unclear). Laws like Washington's 1905 statute
may have represented an extension of court authority to a set of youthful activities previously ignored or handled informally. A. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS 139 (1969). Contra,
Schultz, Book Review, 82 YALE L.J. 629, 632-33 (1973).
13. See note 5 supra. Although juvenile court proceedings are civil rather than criminal, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967), this comment uses "noncriminal" to describe
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Many status offense laws are ambiguous and overly punitive.
By using broad terms like "incorrigible child"'" or "juvenile in
need of supervision,' ' 15 many of the laws enable courts to exercise
jurisdiction over a wide variety of behavior. 6 Additionally, some
juvenile laws fail to provide different penalties for status offenses
and delinquent acts, acts violating the criminal law."7 Connecticut courts, for example, may impose identical sentences on a
runaway child and a juvenile burglar. 8 Secure detention and institutional commitments of status offenders have been frequent
in many jurisdictions."
The purposes of status offense laws explain their characteristics. Status offense laws in America originally enabled colonial
society to maintain children as disciplined members of the family
work force3 ° Since the early nineteenth century, defenders of the
acts that are not criminal if adults commit them.
14. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-241(A)(3) (West Supp. 1977-1978).

15. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-46 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
16. A study by Yale University law students of status offense cases in New York City
found such allegations as having undesirable boyfriends, refusing to bathe regularly, and
sleeping all day were sufficient to justify official intervention in the lives of children under
New York's "person in need of supervision" statutes, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 711-784
(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1977-1978). The most frequent bases for intervention were
"short run away," "refusal to obey," and truancy. Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction,83 YALE L.J. 1383, 1387 n.33 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ungovernability].
17. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 5.
18. Under Connecticut law, both of these children are "delinquent." CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (West Supp. 1978). The Connecticut statute on juvenile court dispositions does not differentiate between types of delinquency. Id. § 17-68.
19. Juvenile detention facilities are children's jails designed for the short-term housing of children involved with the juvenile justice system. Accused and convicted status
offenders and delinquents are typically housed together in these facilities, sometimes with
abused and neglected children. Placement in these facilities is always "temporary," but
many children, especially status offenders, remain in detention for long periods awaiting
other placements or their return home. See The Detention and Jailingof Juveniles: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]. Institutions provide longer-term housing of adjudicated juveniles. These facilities include training schools (the most prevalent and most secure type), forestry camps, ranches, and farms.
Juvenile institutions also typically house status offenders and delinquents together. LAw
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN IN CUSTODY 58 (1974). On a typical day in 1971, juvenile detention facilities and institutions in the
United States held approximately 50,000 adjudicated children. Of the approximately
31,000 inmates for whom offense data were available, 70 per cent of the girls and 23 per
cent of the boys were status offenders. Id. at 6-8.
Federal funding incentives may reduce the incidence of detention and institutionalization of status offenders. See note 4 supra.
20. Sidman, supra note 10, at 43-44. Colonists found this need greater in America
than in England. Here, farms were larger, requiring the labor of children and servants.
The abundance of land, moreover, coupled with the scarcity of labor, reduced the economic dependence of colonial children upon their parents. Laws arose to keep children
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laws have claimed the laws are necessary to prevent unruly children from becoming delinquents or criminals."' Confidence in the
effectiveness of institutionalization and other forms of state intervention to reform wayward children reached its zenith with the
advent of the juvenile court movement in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.2 Broadly written laws permitted courts
wide discretion in selecting children believed most in need of
reformation. Status offenders could receive the same sentences as
delinquent children because the courts' concern supposedly was
with the children's social or emotional needs rather than with the
acts the children committed. The juvenile court founders did not
consider these sentences punishment, but2 3rather means to mold
wayward youths into responsible citizens.
In the midst of attacks on the juvenile court system in recent
years,'2 however, critics have shown status offense laws rest on
mistaken beliefs about adolescent behavior. Although defenders
of status offense laws claim the laws help courts identify potential
obedient and at home. Teitelbaum & Harris, Some HistoricalPerspectives on Governmental Regulation of Children and Parents, in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE
JUVEILE COURT 1, 10-11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND CONTROL].
21. An 1839 Pennsylvania court, for example, defended the institutional commitment
of an unruly girl as necessary to prevent inevitable and more serious misbehavior: "The
infant has been snatched from a course which must have ended in depravity; and, not
only is the restraint of her person lawful but it would be an act of extreme cruelty to release
her from it." Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839). See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform:
An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1970).
22. See Fox, supra note 21, at 1229-30. See also Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa.
48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905). For modem defenses of coercive state intervention with status
offenders, see Arthur, Status Offenders Need Help, Too, 26 Juv. JUST. 3 (1975); Marra &
Sax, PersonalityPatternsand Offense Historiesof Status Offenders and Delinquents,Juv.
& FAM. CT. J., May, 1978, at 27; Martin & Snyder, Jurisdiction over Status Offenses
Should Not Be Removed from the Juvenile Court, 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 44 (1976);
Sheridan, Juveniles Who Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in a Correctional
System?, 31 FED. PROBATION 26 (1967).
23. See, e.g., Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104 (1909):
Why is it not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy or
girl has committed a specific offense, to find out what he is, physically, mentally, morally, and then if it learns that he is treading the path that leads to
criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to
degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal
but a worthy citizen.
Id. at 107.
24. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS,
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

& AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

JUVENILE JUSTICE

STANDARDS PROJECT (1977); A. PLATr, supra note 12; E. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION
(1973); TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

AND YOUTH CRIME (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
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delinquents or criminals,2 5 behavior punishable by status offense
laws is an unreliable indicator of future delinquent or criminal
acts."5 Defying one's 'parents is not necessarily deviant behavior,
but rather is often a normal indication of adolescent striving for
independence.2 1 When this defiance escalates into behavior such
as running away from home, inadequate parents, and not the
child, may be primarily to blame.28 The culpability of parents is
even more likely when such behavior results in referrals to the
juvenile court.29 In perhaps the majority of status offense cases,
25. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
26. A study of high school and college students who, when younger, had repeatedly
disobeyed their parents, showed these young people seldom became delinquent. Legal
Action Support Project, Bureau of Social Science Research, Research Memorandum on
"Status Offenders" 22 (March, 1972), cited in Ungovernability, supra note 16, at 1406
n.139. In another study, a psychiatrist and two social workers attempted to predict delinquency in a group of youths whom teachers, police, and others had identified as potential
troublemakers, the type of youths for whom juvenile courts typically invoke their status
offense jurisdiction. A follow-up survey some 20 years later showed the predictions were
incorrect in about 50 per cent of the cases. E. SCHUR, supra note 24, at 47. A study of
runaway children showed they are also unlikely to graduate to delinquency or crime. R.
SHELLOW, J. SCHAMP, E. LIEBOW, & E. UNGER, SUBURBAN RUNAWAYS OF THE 1960's (MoNoGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY OF RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1967), reprinted in Hearings
on S.2829, the Runaway Youth Act, Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 210, 223-24 (1972).
Cf. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55 (1967) (claiming 90 per cent of the population

of the United States have committed acts referrable to juvenile courts).
27. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 34 (1973). "On the whole ["teenage culture"] is a rebellious, oppositional society,
dedicated to the proposition that the grownup world is a sham." TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 24, at 41. See Rosenheim, Notes on Helping: NormalizingJuvenile Nuisances,
50 Soc. SERVICES REV. 177 (1976). Contra, Marra & Sax, note 22 supra.The authors report
the results of two studies of Washington State status offenders and conclude "the personality structure of many status offenders is not unlike that found in adults who are described as dangerous and unpredictable." Id. at 30.
28. We have all seen situations . . . in which the child beyond control [of
his or her parents] is sound and healthy, and the lack of control is due to
attempts at excessive control, to highly disciplinary or authoritarian attitudes
in control, or to some ignorance or neurotic need on the part of the parent that
a normal child may naturally resist.
Rubin, Legal Definition of Offenses by Children and Youth, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 512, 514.
29. Inadequate and irresponsible parents may find juvenile courts convenient dumping grounds for their problems. The traditional juvenile court system invites parents
unable to control their children to invoke legal sanctions to insure their wishes prevail.
See Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 JtUv. CT. JUDGES J. 42, 43 (1970).
Many children processed in the courts as status offenders are, in fact, victims of parental
neglect. See, e.g., Ungovernability, supra note 16, at 1392 n.67 (concluding that 50 per
cent of the New York status offenders studied were neglected children). Many "runaway"
children are "push-outs," whom their parents forced to leave home. See OFFICE OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, RUNAWAY YOUTH 28
(1978) [hereinafter cited as RUNAWAY YOUTH] (stating that 10 per cent of the children
served in fiscal year 1977 in HEW-funded runaway youth projects were "push-outs");
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however, one cannot accurately apportion blame; these cases
arise from the mutual inability of parent and child to resolve
conflicts with each other.3 Accordingly, because parents may
share the responsibility for their child's status offenses, the standard juvenile court practice of placing responsibility for status
offense violations on the offending child alone, by institutional
commitment or other penalty, is unfair and3 unlikely to correct the
problems underlying the child's behavior.
Juvenile court intervention in status offense cases frequently
is counter-productive and may encourage delinquency rather
than prevent it. Airing family disagreements in court may polarize parent and child instead of bringing them together, 3 and the
humiliation of court involvement may turn a child towards more
serious misbehavior.3 The dispositional alternatives available in
these cases also may make court intervention harmful. The
stigma of institutional commitment may contribute to converting
a rebellious child into a delinquent or criminal. 3' Moreover, many
states permit the institutionalization of status offenders with delinquent children, 5 from whom the status offenders may learn
delinquent habits.3 6 Other coercive court intervention, such as
court-ordered counseling, also is likely to be ineffective because
the sensitive and complex nature of family conflicts, which produce many status offenses, makes these conflicts poorly suited to
forced resolutions. 37 Ironically, the very existence of juvenile court
Cornfield, Emanicipationby Eviction: The Problem of the Domestic Pushout, 1 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 4021 (1975). For a case example of an apparent "push-out," see In re Presley,
47 Il. 2d 50, 264 N.E.2d 177 (1970).
30. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 36; Ungovernability, supra note 16, at 1394.
31. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 11-12; Feeney, The PINS Problem-A "No

Fault" Approach, in

BEYOND CONTROL,

supra note 20, at 249, 257.

32. Status offense proceedings frequently are the scene of efforts by parent and child
to denounce and humiliate each other before the judge. Mahoney, PINS and Parents, in
BEYOND Co rrloL, supra note 20, at 161, 167. For anecdotal illustrations of this phenomenon, see Ungovernability,supra note 16, at 1394-97.
33. If a youth commits a juvenile act . . . and is not apprehended or labeled, he may grow out of his . . . behavior. But if social control agencies
respond to his behavior as "bad," the youth may come to define it and himself
The court appearance may be considered a "status degradation
as "bad." ...
ceremony," where the youth is transformed into a different person.

D.

BLISS, THE EFFECTS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ON SELF-CONCEPT

55 (1977). See

E. SCHUR, supra note 24, at 118-26; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 26-27;
Ungovernability, supra note 16, at 1401.
34. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 1128-29.
35. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 74-83 app.
36. See H. POLSKY, COTTAGE SIx 88, 170-71 (1962); Gough, The Beyond-Control Child
and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. Lois L.J.
182, 191 (1971).
37. "Using legal compulsion to restore (or provide) parent-child understanding and
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authority over status offenses may have hindered development of
more effective responses to juvenile misbehavior.38
In addition to attacking the philosophical basis and the ineffectiveness of status offense laws, critics have pointed to the laws'
frequently inequitable application and consequences. Juvenile
courts sometimes invoke their status offense jurisdiction when
evidence is inadequate to bring delinquency charges against a
child. 3 Accused status offenders generally receive fewer procedural rights at trial than accused delinquents,4o are more likely
to be girls than boys, 4 and are disproportionately the children of
the poor. 2 Convicted status offenders may serve longer terms in
institutions than delinquents,'43 although in many states both
groups ostensibly are subject to the same sentences. 4
tolerance and to build up mechanisms for conflict resolution within the family unit is akin
to doing surgery with a spade." STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 11.
38. One author contends that, although defenders of traditional status offense laws
claim continued court authority over nondelinquent youth is necessary because no other
social institutional will act in such cases, "precisely the opposite is the case; because you
act, no one else does." Bazelon, supra note 29, at 44. The Joint Commission on Juvenile
Justice Standards of the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association predicts removal of status offense jurisdiction will stimulate the creation of voluntary services. STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 15.
39. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 1115-19.
40. Some jurisdictions deny accused status offenders the right against selfincrimination, see, e.g., In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975) and the right to
counsel, see, e.g., In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972). Most jurisdictions
judge status offenders by a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than by the
more rigorous standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at
74-83 app. The Supreme Court has guaranteed certain procedural rights in the adjudicatory phase of trials of delinquents facing institutionalization. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
(rights to counsel, against self-incrimination, to notification of the charges against them,
and to cross-examination of witnesses). The Court has held delinquents do not have a
constitutional right to a jury trial. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
41. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 13; Ungovernability, supra note 16, at 1387 &
n.26. The apparent reason for this statistic is that parents, police, and courts use status
offense laws to enforce standards of sexual conduct against girls while virtually ignoring
boys' sexual behavior. See Gilman, supra note 3, at 51; Sussman, Sex-Based Discrimina-

tion and PINS Jurisdiction,in BEYOND

CONTROL,

supra note 20, at 179, 182-84.

42. See, e.g., Ungovernability,supra note 16, at 1387. Wealthier parents having problems with their children are able to afford nonjudicial kinds of help, such as family
counseling or private schools. See Mahoney, supra note 32, at 165; Rosenheim, Youth
Service Bureaus: A Concept in Search of Definition, 20 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 69, 70 (1969).
43. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 1121 n.116. Release from institutions
often depends on the willingness of parents to accept their children home. Because status
offense violations often arise from parent-child conflict, status offenders' parents may be
more reluctant than parents of delinquents to have their children return home. Id. Contra,
Martin & Snyder, supra note 22: "If [status offenders are] indeed the group which is
'incarcerated' longest . . .is it not probable that these youngsters are more difficult to
help than juveniles directly charged with delinquent acts?" Id. at 45.
44. For an example of equal sentencing for delinquents and status offenders, see note
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FOR REFORM

Dissatisfaction with traditional status offense laws has led to

proposals for a less coercive approach toward status offenders.
Congress has provided funding incentives to states to abolish the
5
detention and institutionalization of nondelinquent children.
Critics have suggested replacing status offense laws with programs of voluntary services to rebellious children and their families." Proposed programs include crisis intervention to resolve
family conflicts at their onset,47 nonsecure residences for children
at odds with their parents, ' 8 and temporary shelters and counseling services for runaways. 9 .
These voluntary programs are encouraging, but not totally
satisfactory, responses to the problems of traditional status offense laws. The programs' lack of coercion should make them
more palatable, and hence more effective, than court-ordered
services.50 Moreover, providing services to both parents and children eliminates the traditional system's unfairness of singling out
the offending child for attention and should be effective in resolv51
ing the family conflicts underlying many status offenses. Crisis
18 supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 4 supra.

46. See, e.g., STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 20; Board of Directors, supra note 1, at 99;
Gilman, supra note 3, at 51.
47. See, e.g., STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 53-54. Crisis intervention, as the Joint
Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards defines it, consists of
an interview or series of interviews with the juvenile or his or her family, as

needed, conducted within a brief period of time by qualified professional persons, and designed to alleviate personal or family situations which present a
serious and imminent threat to the health or stability of the juvenile or the
family .

. .

. [and] should include the arrangement of temporary alternative

nonsecure residential care ....
• . . [and] the provision of or referral to services for suicide prevention,
psychiatric or other medical care, psychological, welfare, legal, educational, or
other social services, as appropriate to the needs of the juvenile and the family.
Id. at 53. Calling crisis intervention a "potent force," one writer has said its power derives
from two factors:
First, it treats the issue not as the fault of the runaway or beyond-control child,
but rather as a problem with which the whole family must deal. Secondly, it
focuses on the general relationships and decision-making process in the family
rather than the-specific event which triggered the crisis. The theory here is that
if the relationships and communication in the family can be placed in good
working order, the family itself will be able to deal with the specific problem.
Feeney, supra note 31, at 259.
48. See, e.g., STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 55-60.

49. See, e.g., Runaway Youth Act, § 312, 42 U.S.C. § 5712 (Supp. 1975). For a current
supra note 29.
50. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 15; note 37 supra and accompanying text.
51. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.

report of projects funded under this Act, see RUNAWAY YoUTr,
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intervention, in particular, has proven successful in restoring harmony between parents and children and in preventing the children's involvement with the juvenile courts.52 A totally voluntary
program, however, may have some problems. For all its abuses,
the traditional approach does provide secure care for those children truly in need of state protection. A voluntary program may
not reach those children in sufficient numbers. The cost and organizational difficulties of establishing and maintaining a satisfactory network of voluntary services pose additional problems in
implementing this alternative to traditional status offense laws. 53

H.

THE NEW WASHINGTON LEGISLATION

Although its status offense legislation had changed only
gradually since 1913,11 Washington State instituted sweeping
52. In a Sacramento County, California program, for example, unruly children and
their parents received intensive family counseling from probation counselors as soon as
possible after the children's referral to the juvenile court. The first year of the program
produced significant differences between over 500 children receiving these crisis intervention services and a similar number in a control group handled by traditional methods.
Children receiving crisis intervention services had 80 per cent fewer court petitions filed
against them, 50 per cent fewer overnight stays in detention, 14 per cent fewer subsequent
court referrals, and 25 per cent fewer referrals for delinquent behavior. Additionally, the
new techniques were less than half as expensive as previous procedures. R. BARON & F.
FEENEY, JUVENILE DIVERSION THROUGH FAMILY COUNSELING 3, 8 (1976).
53. This is the thrust of the dissenting view of a member of the Joint Commission on
Juvenile Justice Standards. STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 67.
54. The early history of status offense laws in Washington was consistent with the
national pattern in both the wording of the laws and the penalties for their violation. The
state's first status offense law was simply worded, authorizing the commitment of
"incorrigible," "mendicant," and "vagrant" children to the new state reform school. Act
of Mar. 7, 1891, ch. 103, 1891 Wash. Laws 195 (no longer in effect) (subsequent history
unclear). A 1905 act, in keeping with the trend of the era, see text accompanying note 12
supra, greatly expanded the list of noncriminal offenses for which courts could institutionalize a child. Act of Feb. 15, 1905, ch. 18, § 1, 1905 Wash. Laws 34 (repealed 1909). See
note 12 supra. In 1913, in an act which endured unchanged for nearly 50 years, the
legislature expanded status offense categories even further. Juvenile Court Law, ch. 160,
§ 1, 1913 Wash. Laws 520 (amended 1961). Some of the categories proscribed specific kinds
of behavior: for example, habitual truancy, id. § 1 (14), liquor, tobacco, and drug usage,
id. § 1(15), and frequenting "the company of reputed criminals, vagrants, or prostitutes,"
id. § 1 (8). Other categories could encompass a variety of behavior. These included being
"incorrigible," id. § 1(12), and being "in danger of growing up to lead an idle, dissolute
or immoral life," id. § 1(16). Violation of any of the categories could result in a finding of
dependency and wardship, id. § 1, meaning the court took responsibility for the child's
"custody, care, guardianship, and control," id. Courts could institutionalize
all status
offenders. Id. § 8. Institutional sentences for status offenders, as for delinquents, lasted
until the age of 21 or until the juveniles' "reformation [was] complete." Id. § 10. The
statute did not prohibit institutionalization of status offenders with delinquents, though
it did prohibit institutionalization of children with adult convicts. Id. § 11.
Legislative and judicial actions between 1961 and 1977 drastically limited the scope
and severity of this 1913 legislation. In 1961, the legislature amended the 1913 laws,
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changes in 1978 embodying many of the proposed reforms. 5 The
state legislature replaced Washington's traditionally broad status
offense laws"6 with legislation restricted to two kinds of behavior:
truancy 57 and running away from home. 58 Running away is the
eliminating or revising flagrantly outmoded categories, but still retaining eight status
offenses. Juvenile Court Law, ch. 302, § 1, 1961 Wash. Laws 2473 (amending 1913 Wash.
Laws, ch. 160, § 1) (formerly codified at WASH. REv. CODE § 13.04.010 (1976)) (repealed
1977) (repeal effective July 1, 1978). A 1967 amendment limited institutionalization of
status offenders to incorrigibles. Act of Mar. 21, 1967, ch. 137, § 1, 1967 Wash. Laws 649
(amending 1961 Wash. Laws, ch. 302, § 6) (amended 1976). In 1975, the Washington
Supreme Court ended the practice of housing incorrigibles and delinquents together in
state institutions. Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975). In the next
year, the legislature restricted institutionalization of incorrigibles to those whose "conduct
evidences a strong likelihood of degenerating into serious delinquent or criminal behavior
if not corrected" and for whom less restrictive measures had failed. Act of Mar. 3, 1976,
ch. 71, § 2, 1975-1976 Wash. Laws 271 (amending 1961 Wash. Laws, ch. 302, § 6, as
amended by 1967 Wash. Laws, ch. 137, § 1) (formerly codified at WASH. Rav. CODE §
13.04.095 (1976)) (repealed 1977) (repeal effective July 1, 1978). This amendment limited
institutionalization of incorrigibles to a 30-day "diagnostic and treatment" session, provided such a session was "reasonably expected to correct such degeneration" and a suitable facility was available. Id.
These legislative and judicial actions placed Washington among the nation's leaders
in status offense law reformation. As of November, 1975, only 15 jurisdictions had statutory restrictions on placement of status offenders with delinquents. None restricted institutionalization to a single category of status offender as did the Washington statute, and
none restricted institutionalization to 30 days as Washington did. See STANDARDS, supra
note 3, at 74-83 app.
With its new legislation, see text accompanying notes 56-152 infra, Washington has
moved further than possibly every other state but Maine in reforming its status offense
laws. Maine, in legislation effective July 1, 1978, removed from the jurisdiction of its
juvenile courts all acts, except for liquor and certain marijuana and traffic violations, that
are not criminal if adults commit them. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 3101, 3103
(West Supp. 1965-1978). The state has statutes governing runaways, id. § § 3501-3508, and
truants, id. tit. 20, § 911.6-A, but virtually all procedures under those statutes are nonjudicial. Maine provides voluntary placements for runaways apprehended by police, id. tit.
15, § 3504, and voluntary social services for runaways and their families, id. tit. 22, §§
3703, 3891-B.
55. The new Washington legislation's treatment of truancy, its concentration on runaways, its emphasis on voluntary services, and its provision for a hearing on alternative
placement for children reflect obvious influence from the proposed juvenile justice standards of the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association.
Compare STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 38-39, 41-60, with WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.30.010.32.050, 28A.27.070, 74.13.031(3), (4) (Supp. 1977). See note 91 infra.
One Washington county earlier had chosen to bypass the state's status offense laws
for many offenders, using instead a program emphasizing voluntary services. The King
County juvenile court referred many status offenders to community-based "juvenile court
conference committees." These committees interviewed children and their parents and
made recommendations for dealing with the problems that precipitated the status offenses. The committees could refer uncooperative children to juvenile court for formal proceedings. Aaron, Juvenile Justice: A Community Concern, 61 JUDICATURE 15, 20-22 (JuneJuly 1977); Comment, Juvenile Court: The Legal Process as a Rehabilitative Tool, 51
WASH. L. Rv. 697, 717-19 (1976).
56. For a discussion of the repealed legislation, see note 54 supra.
57. WASH. REv. CODE § 28A.27.070 (Supp. 1977). Truancy is the only repealed status
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only one of these two acts now referrable to juvenile court and
then only if nonjudicial procedures to reunite parent and child
have failed.5" By restricting court referral, the new legislation
forces nonjudicial, and thus generally more effective, solutions for
other kinds of noncriminal misbehaviorS 0 As an alternative to
court referral, the new laws make voluntary services from the
state's Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) available to rebellious children and their parents."
Washington's new status offense laws focus primarily on runaways. A 1976 survey estimated 733,000 American children run
away from home annually. 2 Their leaving home frequently sigoffense to appear by the same name in the new legislation. Washington formerly punished
truants with "truant schools," Act of Mar. 12, 1903, ch. 78, 1903 Wash. Laws 109 (repealed
1971), dependency, Juvenile Court Law, ch. 160, § 1(14), 1913 Wash. Laws 520 as amended
by 1961 Wash. Laws, ch. 302 (formerly codified at WASH. Rsv. CODE § 13.04.010(9)(1976))
(repealed 1977) (repeal effective July 1, 1978), and institutionalization, id. § 8 as amended
by 1961 Wash. Laws. ch. 302, § 6 (amended 1967). The new statute, however, restricts
the use of coercive measures against truants. Although law enforcement or school attendance officers may still take them into custody without warrants and deliver them to their
parents or schools, truants are no longer referrable to juvenile court. The new legislation
states school officials may inform habitual truants and their parents of services available
from DSHS, but provides no penalties for refusal of services or repeated truancy. If a
school expels a student, even, presumably, for repeated truancy, the statute mandates
only that the school inform child and parents of the availability of services from DSHS,
if appropriate. WASH. REv. CODE, § 28A.27.070 (Supp. 1977).
58. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 13.30.010-.32.050, .34.030(2)(d), 74.13.031(3), (4) (Supp.
1977).
59. For a discussion of the juvenile court's role under the new legislation, see text
accompanying notes 94-152 infra.
The new legislation did not affect the laws establishing minimum ages for possession
and consumption of alcoholic beverages, WASH. REv. CODE § 66.44.270 (1976), and driving
motor vehicles, id. § 46.20.031 (Supp. 1977). These laws are like the repealed status offense
statutes in their exclusive applicability to minors but different in their importance to
public safety and, carrying only minor penalties, in their consequences to children violating them. Because of these differences, this comment does not include these laws in its
discussion of Washington's status offense legislation.
60. For a discussion of the relative merits of judicial and nonjudicial intervention in
status offense cases, see text accompanying notes 32-53 supra.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031(4) (Supp. 1977). The new legislation repeatedly
refers to a child's "parent or custodian." Id. § 13.30.030(3) passim. The legislation does
not define "custodian." The Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards of the
Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association, upon whose standards the legislature obviously based much of the new legislation, see note 55 supra,
defines "custodian" as "any person other than a parent having legal or de facto responsibility for the minor's ongoing care by reason of parental consent, express or implied, or
pursuant to court order." STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 43. This definition appears to fit
the term as used in the new legislation. For brevity, this comment employs "parent" when
the new legislation refers to "parent or custodian."
62. This statistic includes children of ages 10 through 17 who leave home for at least
one night without parental permission. The National Statistical Survey on Runaway
Youth, cited in RUNAWAY YOUTH, supra note 29, at 4.
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nals serious family disharmony. 3 While away from home, these
children are vulnerable to emotional and physical problems, drug
and alcohol abuse, and exploitative adults. They frequently need
personal counseling, in addition to food, shelter, and medical
care.64 The new Washington legislation offers four responses to the
problems of runaways: (1) the Runaway Youth Act, 3 (2) DSHS
services, 6 (3) juvenile court referral to settle placement disputes, 7 and (4) dependency proceedings. 6
A.

The Runaway Youth Act

The Runaway Youth Act details procedures for law enforcement officers to follow when dealing with runaway children. Specific procedures for runaways were absent from previous Washington statutes, allowing each locality to formulate its own policies. Authorities often confined runaways in secure detention facilities.69 The Runaway Youth Act and companion sections in the
new Washington legislation, however, mandate measures calculated to ensure the safety of apprehended runaways, usually without incarceration, and to aid in resolving conflicts that precipitated the children's leaving home. The Runaway Youth Act authorizes law enforcement officers to take runaways into limited
custody for up to twelve hours. 70 Apprehended runaways may
choose to return home or to go to the home of a relative or other
63. STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 48.
64. Of those children seeking assistance at HEW-funded runaway projects, the majority primarily sought help for "intrafamily problems." RUNAWAY YoUTH, supra note 29,

exhibit G. On the problems of runaways, see L. AMBROSINO,

RUNAWAYS

(1971).

65. WASH. REv. CODE § 13.30.010-.040 (Supp. 1977).
66. Id. § 74.13.031(3), (4).
67. Id. § 13.32.010-.050.
68. Id. § 13.34.030(2)(d), .040, .110, .140.
69. Interview with Don Meath, deputy prosecutor of Pierce County, Wash., in Tacoma, Wash. (Sept. 7, 1977). Though conditions vary widely, many juvenile detention
facilities nationally, like jails for adults, are overcrowded, understaffed storage facilities,
where violence is commonplace and medical and psychological treatment inadequate. See
1973 Hearings, supra note 19. For more information on these facilities, see note 19 supra.
Proponents of juvenile detention argue it is a valuable resource for some status offenders,
ensuring the children's presence at court proceedings and for medical and rehabilitative
care and, as an ultimate sanction, helping to enforce court orders to participate in treatment programs. See, e.g., Arthur, Should Status Offenders Go to Court?, in BEYOND
CONTROL, supra note 20, at 235, 238, 242. See also text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
70. Officers may take into custody reported runaways and children reasonably believed to be "in circumstances which constitute a substantial and immediate danger to
the [juveniles'] physical safety." WASH. REV. CODE § 13.30.020 (Supp. 1977). The Act
gives no guidance to officers in determining whether those circumstances are present.
Officers have 12 hours from the time of their "initial contact" with the runaway to take
the child home or to an alternative placement. Id.
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responsible person.' Law enforcement officers must transport or
arrange transportation for children who agree to one of these alternatives. 2 If a child refuses these alternatives, if the place chosen is at an unreasonable distance, or if the officers are unable to
arrange a safe release, the law directs the officers to take the child
to a temporary, nonsecure, residential facility licensed by
DSHS.7 3 The law also mandates the offering of social services to
runaways and their families who need them."
The Runaway Youth Act has alarmed some juvenile court
judges and administrators. They criticize the legislature's failure
to appropriate money to implement the new procedures. They
charge the new law gives runaways too much power to determine
their placements, power that children may be unable to exercise
wisely. These critics predict the limited coerciveness of the new
procedures will undermine parental authority,7 7 and that police,
unhappy with the new law's philosophy and unwilling to be saddled with placement responsibilities, will be reluctant to take
runaways into custody. 8
Some of these fears are valid. The new legislation does not
provide adequately for those runaways most in need of state pro71. Id. § 13.30.030(1).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 13.30.030(5). If the child does not return home, the Act requires officers or
the residential facility staff to notify parents of the child's apprehension and release. Id.
§§ 13.03.030(3), 74.13.031(4).
74. If officers return the runaway home or place him or her with a relative or other
responsible person, they must advise the child and the person to whom the child is
released of the availability of social services if needed. Id. § 13.30.030(2). DSHS child
welfare staff must offer services to children placed in DSHS homes and to the children's
parents. Id. § 74.13.031(4).
75. See, e.g., Layton, New Juvenile Law Has Problems, Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
April 3, 1978, § A, at 6, col. 1. The only state funds appropriated for implementing the
new juvenile code were $983,600 for diversion units required under the code's delinquency
provisions. See WASH. REv. CODE § 13.40 (Supp. 1977) (introductory material). Proponents
of the new code anticipated Washington's governor would call a special legislative session
in 1978, at which they would seek additional appropriations. The governor did not call
the special session, however, and additional state funding proposals must await the legislature's regular session in 1979. See Layton, supra. In the meantime, the Federal Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration has awarded the state $3.6 million for crisis intervention services, temporary residential care, and other programs established by the new
status offense legislation. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 16, 1978, § A, at 3, col. 2.
76. See Jones, New Juvenile Code: A Legal Box, The Seattle Times, Oct. 2, 1977, §
A, at 11, col. 1. One judge feared the new law does not provide properly "for handling the
kid of 13, 14, or 15 who wants to live in an inappropriate setting, with say an older alcoholic
or pimp." Layton, supra note 75.
77. See Jones, supra note 76; Layton, supra note 75; Mottram, Controversial Law
Takes Effect July 1, Tacoma News Tribune, Dec. 25, 1977, § D, at 7, col. 1.
78. See Mottram, County Officials Aren't Happy, Tacoma News Tribune, Dec. 25,
1977, § D, at 7, col. 5.
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tection. Employing their old status offense jurisdiction, courts
could detain mentally and physically ill runaways until they
could receive needed treatment, and could order unwilling children to submit to treatment. Although coercive status offense
legislation lent itself to many abuses,79 life-saving medical or
mental health treatment for children is an area in which coercion
may be necessary and proper. The new legislation does not allow
courts to detain seriously physically ill runaways who refuse
treatment.8° Although another Washington statute permits.the
brief detention and the institutionalization of mentally ill children in state-owned or licensed facilities,' few of these facilities
exist in the state.12 Washington's voluntary mental health agencies, which ideally should bolster their programs to reach mentally ill children formerly treated under the status offense jurisdiction, are sorely underfunded. The legislature has not increased
appropriations sufficiently to these facilities and agencies to establish them as adequate alternatives to juvenile court control
over mentally ill status offenders. 3 Accordingly, some of these
children will not receive needed treatment. Another concern expressed about the Runaway Youth Act, that of police enforcement of the Act, is also troublesome. Because the reforms of the
new legislation benefit primarily those runaways police apprehend,84 active police support for the Act is necessary if those
reforms are to reach satisfactory numbers of children. Perhaps
demonstrated success with the Act and relief from some of the
placement responsibilities will ensure that support. 5
Notwithstanding the validity of some of the criticism of the
79. See text accompanying notes 14-19 and 24-44 supra.
80. These children might include, for example, diabetics, cancer patients, and children needing kidney dialysis.
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 72.23.070 (Supp. 1977).
82. The state has only a single 32-bed institution for psychotic children and a 16-bed
ward for mentally ill delinquents. Private hospitals in the state have an additional 37
places for mentally ill children. Perkins, Patient or Victim of State Mental Health Care?,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 10, 1978, § B, at 3, col. 1.
83. The National Institute of Mental Health ranks Washington, the 22nd most populous state, 44th nationally in spending for mental health care. In 1977, the Washington
Legislature appropriated $1.3 million for new children's mental health programs. Yet, a
survey by a governor's panel found only six per cent of Washington children receive needed
mental health treatment. Id.
84. See text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
85. Larger police forces may be able to delegate placement responsibilities to civilian
employees. Seattle uses "community service officers," who have no arrest powers, to deal
with many juvenile and family-related police problems, including the placement of runaway children. Interview with Alvin R. Elliott, Law Enforcement Liaison Officer, King
County, Wash. Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Juvenile Division, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug.
31, 1978).
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Runaway Youth Act, critics' concerns about the Act's permissiveness are exaggerated. The new procedures make sense for the vast
majority of runaways. In allowing runaways to refuse to let police
take them home, the legislature has recognized that running
away from home, like other status offenses, often stems from
family conflicts that forced return of the runaways is unlikely to
resolve. 8 Also, the Act's provision for counseling to parents as
well as children should strengthen the family. " The new procedures, furthermore, are not without their coercive aspects. They
permit, for example, the continued use of secure detention for
some runaways, 8 in addition to the initial twelve-hour period of
limited custody. 9 Also, a child's control over his or her placement
is short-lived; ultimate legal control rests with parents or the
courts. ° The new procedures merely give preference to voluntary
reconciliations of runaways and parents.
86. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
87. See note 29 and text accompanying notes 24-31 and 51-52 supra. Early experience
with the new law supports this conclusion. Bryant, Runaway Kids With No Place to Go,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 3, 1978, § A, at 6, col. 1.
88. The law authorizes the secure detention for 72 hours, excluding Sundays and
holidays, of children, apprehended by police, who have either run away from a previous
placement and whom DSHS staff believe would run away from a different placement or
who refuse to return home or be placed in alternative residential care. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 74.13.031(4)(g) (Supp. 1977). Past Washington law permitted detention for up to 144
hours, excluding Sundays and holidays, without a court order, and unlimited detention
with a court order. Juvenile Court Law, ch. 302, § 2, 1961 Wash. Laws 2473 (formerly
codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.053 (1976)) (repealed 1977) (repeal effective July 1,
1978). See notes 19 & 69 supra for more information about secure detention.
During a runaway's detention, DSHS staff must try to effect a placement agreeable
to both child and parents. If the parties reach no agreement, the statute states a petition
"shall be filed" for juvenile court approval of an alternative placement for the child and
mandates the release of the child from detention if the court does not hear the petition
within 72 hours of the child's initial confinement, exclusive of Sundays and holidays.
WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031(4)(g) (Supp. 1977).
This last provision is ambiguous. The statute states a petition "shall be filed" within
48 hours of the child's detention, pursuant to WASH. REv. CODE § 74.13.031(4)(f). That
subsection provides that child or parent "may file" a petition to approve alternative
placement. It does not authorize anyone else to file such a petition. Section
74.13.031(4)(g), then, would appear to compel the child or parent to file a petition. The
statute, however, does not provide a means to compel a filing nor does it state the consequences to the child if no one files a petition. Presumably, the child will still be free to
leave detention after 72 hours if neither he nor his parent files a petition.
For a discussion of the alternative placement procedures of the new legislation, see
text accompanying notes 94-117 infra.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.30.020 (Supp. 1977).
90. Parents of children whom officers place with relatives or other responsible persons
do not lose custody of their children. The new legislation does not give children the right
to remain in these placements. Should persons receiving the children refuse to relinquish
them, the parents' appropriate remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. See Wade v. State, 39
Wash. 2d 744, 238 P.2d 914 (1951). See also STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 59. Courts will
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DSHS Services

To try to achieve voluntary reconcilations, the statute requires that DSHS offer runaways and their parents services, including crisis intervention, to facilitate the child's return home
or placement in a living arrangement agreeable to both parents
and child." While seeking such an agreement, DSHS must offer
temporary, nonsecure residential care to runaways police take
into limited custody. 2 If these services do not produce an agreement on where a runaway is to live, either parent or child may
petition the juvenile court for approval of an alternative placement .93
C. Juvenile Court Referral for Placement Disputes
The hearing of petitions for approval of alternative residential placements is a new concept in Washington juvenile legislation.94 The new legislation confers a "special jurisdiction" upon
juvenile courts, allowing them to decide the issue of a child's
placement without making any other legal determination regarding child or parent. 5 Under previous law, in cases not involving
charges of delinquency, the court could decide a child's placement pursuant only to a petition alleging dependency 6 because
of either parental abuse or neglect, or the child's commission of
a status offense. 7 This procedure failed in cases of parent-child
determine the ultimate placement of children placed in DSHS-licensed facilities who
continue to disagree with their parents about where they should live. See WASH. REv. CODE
§ 13.32.010-.050 (Supp. 1977). For a discussion of the courts' placement role under the new
legislation, see text accompanying notes 94-152 infra.
91. Crisis intervention is available on a voluntary basis to all families "who are in
conflict." WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031(3) (Supp. 1977). The Washington definition of
"crisis intervention" repeats virtually verbatim the definition in the IJA-ABA juvenile
justice standards. STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 53. See note 47 supra. The key difference
in the Washington statute is the omission of the standards' provision of temporary residential care to all juveniles in conflict with their families.
92. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031(4) (Supp. 1977).
93. Id. § 74.13.031(4)(f). The legislation does not explain the consequences to the
child if no one files a petition. See note 88 supra. If the parent refuses to permit the child
to return home and parent and child cannot agree on another living arrangement, the
legislation directs child welfare services staff to file a dependency petition on behalf of
the child. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031(4)(d) (Supp. 1977).
94. This provision reflects heavy influence from the IJA-ABA juvenile justice standards. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 55-60.
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32.020 (Supp. 1977).
96. A dependency finding meant the court took responsibility for the child's
"custody, care, guardianship, and control." Juvenile Court Law, ch. 160, § 1, 1913 Wash.
Laws 520 (formerly codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010 (1976)) (repealed 1977)
(repeal effective July 1, 1978).
97. Id., as amended by 1961 Wash. Laws, ch. 302, § 1 (formerly codified at WASH.
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conflict not involving abuse or neglect because it required courts
to determine fault before considering the central issue of the
child's placement. In instances of family conflict, the requirement of such a fault determination could exacerbate family tensions rather than calm them." It could also encourage children
seeking to escape unhappy home situations to petition the court
to declare them status offenders" or induce children to allege,
without justification, parental abuse or neglect. The linking of a
placement determination with dependency had unfavorable consequences for both the state and the child. The state became
burdened with the care and legal responsibilities""' of many children who did not need such protection.' For the child, a finding
of dependency resulted in loss of freedom, including possible institutionalization." 2 The new alternative placement procedure,
addressing only the issue of placement, corrects many of these
problems by abandoning the requirement of a fault determination, and saves the state the legal entanglements of dependency.
The alternative placement procedure, however, like the provision for temporary residential care for runaways," 3 is unnecessarily restrictive in its availability only to runaways police take
into limited custody under the Runaway Youth Act. Runaways
who escape police detection are unable to take advantage of these
provisions voluntarily. Because of limited police resources, the
ambiguities of the grounds for apprehension of runaways,"" and
possible police dissatisfaction with the new law,"" police may not
REV. CODE § 13.04.010 (1976)) (repealed 1977) (repeal effective July 1, 1978).
98. See Feeney, supra note 31, at 257-58. Feeney analogizes status offense laws to
traditional divorce laws because of their shared "requirement that the court make a
determination concerning the acrimonious and destructive issue of fault." Id. at 258. He
urges the adoption of a "no fault" approach toward family conflicts similar to the philosophy of "no fault" divorce laws. See notes 32 & 37 supra and accompanying text on the
damaging effects of status offense proceedings on family harmony.
99. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975), in which a teenaged
girl, whose dependency petition the juvenile court previously denied, was successful in
having herself declared incorrigible so the court could approve her placement away from
her parents. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 37; Comment, Status Offenses: Do Children
Have the Legal Right to be Incorrigible?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 659.
100. See, e.g., Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 260,
407 P.2d 440, 447 (1965) (stating that in a tort action the state responsibility for wards of
the court "may be likened to that of parent to child").
101. See generally notes 26, 28, & 29 and text accompanying notes 24-31 supra.
102. Washington courts could institutionalize all dependent status offenders prior to
1967, all "incorrigibles" prior to 1976, and certain "incorrigibles" until the new legislation
took effect July 1, 1978. See note 54 supra.
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031(4) (Supp. 1977). See text accompanying note 92
supra.
104. See note 70 supra.
105. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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apprehend a satisfactory portion of runaways. Those runaways
not apprehended will be denied access to temporary residential
care and alternative residential placements.""
For apprehended runaways who do secure a hearing for approval of alternative placement, the court may approve their al, If the court approves
ternative placement or return them home. 07
alternative placement, it may either approve the child's choice of
residence or send the child to a DSHS-licensed, nonsecure resi0 The statute also prodence, such as a foster or group home.'1
vides:
Prior to approving an alternative residential placement, the
court shall find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
reasons for request of alternative residential placement are not
capricious and that there is a conflict between the parent and
the child that cannot be remedied by counseling, crisis intervention, or continued placement in the parental home. 0 9
In allowing the court to order continued placement in the parental home, the legislature has rejected critics' recommendations
against forced reconciliation of a runaway and his or her parents.110 Voluntary reconciliations are more likely to endure than
court-ordered reconciliations because voluntary reconciliations
indicate at least temporary resolution of the problems that provoked the child's leaving home. If a child left home for a trivial
reason, a forced return may legitimately affirm parental authority, but truly "capricious" acts of running away are the exception."' Although this provision allows courts to deal with that
106. But cf. Bryant, The New Deal for Runaways, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 4,
1978, § B, at 1, col. 1 (quoting a DSHS administrator that denying DSHS residences to
these children may deter acts of running away).
Many runaways, one may safely assume, would take advantage of freely available
DSHS residences. Significant numbers of troubled children seek assistance voluntarily.
Of the first 2,000 families receiving crisis intervention services under the new law, about
350 were families of children who went independently to DSHS for help. Only 454 were
families of runaways apprehended by police. Bryant, supra note 87. More importantly,
the most vulnerable runaways are those most likely to seek assistance. A disproportionately large number of young, female, and "push-out" children seek help at HEWfunded runaway projects. RUNAWAY YOUTH, supra note 29, at 28-30.
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32.040 (Supp. 1977).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 59.
111. For a discussion of runaways' motivations, see Note, California Runaways, 26
HASTINCS L.J. 1013, 1014-17 (1975). "From whatever perspective the runaway is defined,
running away cannot be seen solely as a negative, unbalanced, and impulsive response.
In many instances it may be the most intelligent, rational act possible in the face of an
intolerable situation." Id. at 1016 (footnote omitted). See note 29 supra on the phenomenon of the "push-out" child.
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exception, it should not become a loophole whereby courts may
avoid acknowledging the family problems underlying many acts
of running away."
A court order to return home under the new law, however,
will not result in a truly forced return because the law does not
include enforcement provisions. A child disagreeing with the
order may disobey it without fear of more serious sanctions. Instances of such defiance will inevitably arise in a system that
generally abolishes physical restraint of status offenders. Coping
with this defiance will be difficult but is preferable to the alternatives of detention or institutional commitment of uncooperative
children.113 The new law, however, does not provide adequately
for the needs of children who defy a court order to return home.
Although they will have access to crisis intervention services,",
children unwilling to remain with their parents and denied alter112. The placement hearing statute includes procedural safeguards for children and
their parents. The statute requires the appointment of legal counsel for the child and
provides the parent may also have legal counsel at the hearing. WASH. REv. CODE §
13.32.030 (Supp. 1977). The lack of guaranteed counsel for parents is presumably because
the hearing determines only the child's placement and not legal custody. The Washington
Supreme Court has required court-appointed counsel for indigent parents in permanent
child deprivation proceedings. In re Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974). The
court subsequently held the Luscier ruling applicable to dependency proceedings from
which permanent deprivation proceedings are likely to follow. In re Myricks, 85 Wash. 2d
252, 533 P.2d 841 (1975).
Additionally, the placement hearing statute provides for a review of the alternative
placement within six months of the hearing and for subsequent hearings at least every
six months thereafter. During the child's placement, DSHS must continue to offer social
services to child and parents in hopes of effecting a reconciliation. At review hearings, the
court will determine whether DSHS has complied with this requirement. WASH. REv. CODE
§ 13.32.050 (Supp. 1977). The statute provides no enforcement procedure for this requirement.
113. For information about detention and institutional commitments, see notes 19 &
69 and text accompanying notes 19 and 34-36 supra. See STANDARDS, supra note 3:
[Ilt is inevitable that there will be some hard cases where the juvenile refuses
to go home, and refuses to agree to any acceptable alternative living arrangements or refuses to stay in the temporary facility. These standards do not provide coercive sanctions to keep the juvenile there, on the conviction that the
existence of such sanctions will inevitably lead back to a status offense jurisdiction . . . . Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that the vast majority of runaway youth will be amenable to acceptable alternative living arrangements if
they are not ordered to accept them and are not ordered to return home. Some
juveniles will simply flee, and keep fleeing. Some will commit crimes in flight.
If they do, they will be subject to and should be dealt with under the delinquency jurisdiction. As with the rest of the status offense jurisdiction, it is
submitted that the social costs of retaining it to provide for secure detention or
other sanctions in what is expected to be a relatively small number of cases, are
too great.
Id. at 52.
114. See WASH. REv. CODE § 74.13.031(3) (Supp. 1977); note 91 supra.
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native placement by the courts will have no state-provided home
unless police apprehend them and take them to DSHS temporary
facilities. 1 5 This further exemplifies the need to extend access to
those facilities to all runaways."" In contrast to the lack of provisions for children refusing a court order to return home, the new
legislation provides complete and comparatively harsh procerefuse to remain in a court-approved alterdures for children who
7
native placement."
D.

Dependency Proceedings

A juvenile court may declare children dependent and commit
them to an institution for thirty days if they refuse to obey an
alternative placement order."' The new Washington legislation
permits dependency findings for abused, neglected, abandoned,
and orphaned children."' Retaining some language from prior
law, 20 the dependency statute also authorizes a finding of dependency against any child:
(i) Who is in conflict with his or her parent, guardian or
custodian;
(ii) Who refuses to remain in any nonsecure residential
placement ordered by a court pursuant to RCW 13.32.040;
(iii) Whose conduct evidences a substantial likelihood of
degenerating into serious delinquent behavior if not corrected;
and
of custodial treatment in a diagnostic
(iv) Who is in need
2
facility.'1
treatment
and
this
A court may institutionalize a child it finds dependent under
22
section for up to thirty days for diagnosis and treatment.'
In contrast to other sections of the new legislation confining
official intervention against status offenders to narrowly defined
situations, 23 this dependency provision invites broad application
115. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.30.030(5) (Supp. 1977); text accompanying notes 69-

74 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 103-06 supra.
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.030(2)(d), .040, .110, .140 (Supp. 1977).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 13.34.030(2)(a)-(2)(c).
120. Act of Mar. 3, 1976, ch. 71, § 2, 1975-1976 Wash. Laws 271 (amending 1961
Wash. Laws, ch. 302, § 6, as amended by 1967 Wash. Laws, ch. 137, § 1) (formerly codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.095 (1976)) (repealed 1977) (repeal effective July 1, 1978). See
note 54 supra.
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.030(2)(d) (Supp. 1977).
122. Id. § 13.34.140.
123. Id. §§ 13.30.010-.32.050, 74.13.031(3), (4). See text accompanying notes 54-117

supra.
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because it does not define "serious delinquent behavior." The
new Washington legislation on delinquency abandons the term
"delinquent" for the term "juvenile offender."' 24 The legislation
specifically defines a "serious" juvenile offender,'25 but the dependency statute does not refer to that definition. Thus, a court
interpreting the dependency statute may freely apply its own
definition of "serious delinquent behavior." Nor does the legislation provide a standard for determining "substantial likelihood of
degenerating into serious delinquent behavior." This lack of guidance is understandable because the prediction of delinquency is
a complex and imprecise art. Some social scientists have claimed
moderate success in delinquency prediction,' but their methods
involve extensive research into a child's formative years and are
impractical for the average juvenile court. 7 In any event, because the statute is silent on the method by which a court is to
predict delinquency, a court applying the dependency statute to
runaways is likely to rely on instinct or intuition. 21
124. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020(11) passim (Supp. 1977). In other places, the
legislation uses the term "youthful offenders." E.g., id. § 13.40.010(2). Another section
states "All references to juvenile delinquents or juvenile delinquency in other chapters of
the Revised Code of Washington shall be construed as meaning juvenile offenders or the
commitment of an offense by juveniles as defined by this chapter." Id. § 13.40.240.
125. (1) "Serious offender" means a person fifteen years of age or older
who has committed an offense which if committed by an adult would be:
(a) A class A felony, or an attempt to commit a class A felony;
(b) Manslaughter in the first degree, rape in the first degree, or rape in
the second degree; or
(c) Assault in the second degree, extortion in the first degree, indecent
liberties, kidnaping in the second degree, robbery in the second degree, burglary
in the second degree, statutory rape in the first degree, or statutory rape in the
second degree, where such offenses include the infliction of grievous bodily harm
upon another or where during the commission of or immediate withdrawal from
such an offense the perpetrator uses a deadly weapon or firearm as defined in
RCW 9A.04.110.
Id. § 13.40.020(1).
126. See, e.g., S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, PREDICTING DELINQUENCY AND CRIME (1959).
127. Critics have also disputed the validity of the Gluecks' methods. See, e.g., E.
SCHUR, supra note 24, at 49-50.
128. For a discussion of how vague status offense laws force judges applying them to
rely on personal values, see Ungovernability, supra note 16, at 1402-05. Their observations
of New York judges led the authors to conclude:
The [status offense] jurisdiction affords less protection against the intrusion of the judge's personal predilections than do other legal proceedings that
consider narrower issues; and because the persons dealt with are youths, the
personal predilections of judges as adult decisionmakers are more likely to be
subject to inaccuracies and misconceptions. Youths are often seen as less than
full persons, whose problems judges and adults generally assume are easily
understood and readily remedied. Judges are also more likely to universalize
unconsciously their own experiences and standards with juveniles than with
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The dependency statute's vague language and its reliance on
delinquency prediction may result in inequitable application of
the statute. Historically, courts have construed vaguely written
status offense laws broadly to include relatively innocent behavior. 129 Some courts, adhering to the discredited notion that status
offenses themselves predict delinquency, may feel any runaway
is in danger of "degenerating into serious delinquent behavior."'""
Another court may require a past history of delinquency to satisfy
the statute or may rule that adolescent sexual conduct leads to
delinquency.'31 It appears likely, therefore, that the statute's imprecision will lead courts to misidentify some children as poten-

tial delinquents .132
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof required to
find a status offender dependent under the new legislation 3 3 is an
inadequate safeguard against such errors because the statute's
vagueness lessens the effect of the standard. A minimum of evidence could sustain the burden of proof if a court adopts a sufficiently broad definition of "substantial likelihood of degenerating
into serious delinquent behavior."'3 The judge who believes that
any runaway is a potential delinquent may find the burden of
proof easily satisfied in every case. In addition to finding potential delinquency, a court must find a parent-child conflict, a readults; the consequence is a foreclosing of receptivity to the individual juvenile's
particular social and personal circumstances.
Id. at 1403-04 (footnotes omitted).
129. See, e.g., note 16 supra.
130. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
131. Courts have used status offense laws to impose their sexual standards on juveniles. See note 41 supra.
132. For criticism of this result of predictive juvenile court laws, see Glen, Juvenile
Court Reform: ProceduralProcess and Substantive Stasis, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 431, 441-47.
Glen points out that by restricting the liberty of children on the basis of their potential
delinquency, juvenile courts unjustly punish children who will not become delinquent. He
urges the restriction of juvenile court jurisdiction to violations of the criminal law. "[One
could then be sure that he is coercing only those children who have in fact, and not merely
as a matter of prediction, broken the law." Id. at 444. See Note, Parens Patriaeand
Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745, 761 (1973).
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.140 (Supp. 1977). Other subsections of the dependency
statute, which do not allow for the institutionalization of a child, require the less stringent
preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. § 13.34.130.
134. In voiding for vagueness a California statute governing minors "in danger of
leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life," a three-judge federal district court
commented that the statute "defines the substance of the offense so broadly that the
procedural safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt becomes meaningless. Standards
of proof depend upon standards of relevance and probativeness, and these are precluded
when the substantive offense covers the entire moral dimension of one's life." Gonzales v.
Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) at 12, vacated & remanded on other
grounds, 416 U.S. 918 (1974), quoted in Note, supra note 132, at 756 n.71.
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fusal to stay in a court-ordered placement, and a need for custodial treatment in a diagnostic and treatment facility. 31 The
requirements of a conflict and a refusal to stay in a placement will
virtually always be clear-cut factual determinations, satisfied by
asking whether the child did or did not run away. The final requirement, the need for custodial treatment, like the delinquency
prediction requirement, lends itself to subjective interpretation.
Judges adhering to the traditional juvenile court belief in the
effectiveness of institutionalization for reforming wayward children 3l will have little difficulty in finding "beyond a reasonable
doubt" a need for custodial treatment.
Appellate court review, however, may restrain lower courts
from construing the dependency requirements too liberally. The
new legislation's guarantee of counsel for runaways at virtually
every step of their contact with the judicial system 137 should lead
to rapid appeals of dependency findings.'3 Like courts nationally, "' 9 however, Washington courts have been deferential toward
status offense laws."10 Courts have relied on the doctrine of parens
patriae-the notion that the state is a super-parent of its children-in upholding sweeping laws for the "protection" of juveniles."' Because of the new legislation's emphasis away from the
traditional paternalism of juvenile laws, however, appellate
courts reviewing findings under the dependency statute should
not seek automatic refuge in parens patriae. The courts, rather,
should interpret the statute with the realization that the predominant philosophy of Washington's status offense laws is no longer
paternalism but the belief that juveniles are important members
of their families and society.
Although stringent appellate review may restrain lower
courts from construing the dependency requirements too liberally, the dependency provisions for runaways suffer from defects
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.030(2)(d)(i), (ii), (iv) (Supp. 1977).
136. See text accompanying notes 22 and 23 supra.
137. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.32.030, .34.090, 74.13.031(4)(d) (Supp. 1977).
138. For a discussion of the role attorneys can play in protecting children against
sweeping status offense laws, see Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 1130-44.
139. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 9-11; Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at
1121-30.
140. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975); Blondheim v.
State, 84 Wash. 2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975); In re Jackson, 6 Wash. App. 962, 497 P.2d
259 (1972). The courts in these cases upheld the constitutionality of the former Washington "incorrigibility" statute, Juvenile Court Law, ch. 160, § 1(12), 1913 Wash. Laws 520
(formerly codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(7) (1976)) (repealed 1977) (repeal
effective July 1, 1978).
141. See, e.g., S**** S**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560 (Me. 1973); In re Hudson, 13 Wash.
2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); Note; supra note 132 at 748-49.
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beyond their vagueness. A court's options after it finds runaways
dependent under the new statute are illogical and impractical.
Courts may send such children to either a nonsecure residential
facility or a custodial diagnostic and treatment facility.' To
make the initial dependency finding, however, a court must find
runaways in need of "custodial treatment in a diagnostic and
treatment facility.""' Sending the children to a nonsecure residential facility denies them the very treatment the court has
found they need. Moreover, the legislation allows a court to commit a child to a diagnostic and treatment facility for only thirty
days and then only if "diagnosis and treatment is [sic] reasonably expected to prevent degeneration of the child's conduct into
serious delinquent behavior."'" Although the thirty-day limit
protects children against the long and damaging institutional
commitments traditionally given many status offenders,'45 the
expectation that any treatment, especially one limited to thirty
days, will "prevent" delinquency is unrealistic given the present
capabilities of the behavioral sciences.'" Following their commitment, children who have been adjudged potentially serious delinquents will return to the community, presumably "cured," after
what will have been at best superficial treatment of their purported problems. This absurd result represents a failed attempt
at a compromise between the legislature's interests in protecting
society against crime and protecting the rights of children.
The new legislation contains further potential for abuse in
the application of the dependency provisions for runaways. The
court's disposition alternatives and the vagueness of the delinquency prediction language enable courts to use the dependency
statute not to ensure treatment for delinquency-bound children,
but to coerce them into accepting court-ordered nonsecure placements. Interpreting the dependency requirements broadly, a
court could find dependent any child who refuses a court-ordered
placement.' 7 Faced with a thirty-day institutional commitment,
142.
143.
144.
145.
notes 19
146.

WASH. REv. CODE §

13.34.140 (Supp. 1977).

Id. § 13.34.030(2)(d)(iv).
Id. § 13.34.140 (emphasis added).
For information on the institutionalization of status offenders and its effects, see
& 43 and text accompanying notes 19, 34-36, and 43 supra.
See, e.g., Fox, supra note 21, at 1234-35; Fox, PredictiveDevices and the Reform

of Juvenile Justice, in IDENTIFICATION

OF PREDELINQUENTS

107, 108 (1972); Toby, An Evalu-

ation of Early Identification and Intensive Treatment Programs for Predelinquents, 13
Soc. PROs. 160 (1965). Toby describes the Cambridge-Somerville youth study which disclosed that, after a minimum of four years of treatment, 41 per cent of the boys treated
were subsequently convicted of a major crime compared to 37 per cent in a control group
receiving no treatment. Id. at 162-63.
147. See text accompanying notes 123-32 supra.
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the child would likely agree to the original court-ordered placement. The court could then accept the child's change of heart and
send him or her to a nonsecure placement, despite the court's
having found beyond a reasonable doubt that the child is on the
brink of "serious delinquent behavior" and in need of custodial
diagnosis and treatment. Although nonsecure placement may
very well be a better alternative than institutionalization, the
disposition alternatives should reflect, not ignore, the dependency requirements. The need for custodial treatment should
not be a requirement for dependency unless provision of that
treatment is mandatory upon a finding of dependency.
The dependency statute, then, is inconsistent with the new
legislation's generally progressive approach towards status offense problems. 4 ' The truancy statute'4 9 and the other provisions
for runaways5 0 generally forsake the vague language and the potential for broad judicial intervention that have proved troublesome in traditional status offense legislation.'"' The dependency
statute, however, retains these troublesome characteristics and
seems likely to produce the same ineffectiveness and inequities
associated with traditional status offense laws. This possibility is
especially likely because the dependency statute is the only provision in the new legislation that allows prolonged confinement of
runaways. Proponents of confinement are likely to seize upon the
statute, despite its inadequacies, as the only means available to
"protect" runaways.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Washington Legislature, in revising its status offense
legislation, reduced the scope of the juvenile court's authority
over children's noncriminal misbehavior. The legislature provided for nonjudicial help for troubled families, temporary shelter
for some runaways, and a means of obtaining court-sanctioned
placement without a finding of dependency for children in conflict with their parents. Although access to some of these services
is unnecessarily restrictive, these reforms made Washington a
leader in the correction of abuses of status offense jurisdiction.
148. See generally text accompanying notes 54-117 supra.

149.

WASH. REV. CODE

§ 28A.27.070 (Supp. 1977).

150. Id. §§ 13.30.010-.32.050, 74.13.031(3), (4).
151. See text accompanying notes 14-19 and 32-38 supra.
152. "Protection," in some cases, may be the correct word to use. See text accompanying notes 79-84 supra for a discussion of the deficiencies in the new legislation's
treatment of physically and mentally ill status offenders.
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The legislature, however, failed to abolish the status offense jurisdiction altogether and created a new and ill-defined class of status offender whom courts may punish with a finding of dependency and short-term institutional commitment. This category
perpetuates, though to a lesser degree, many defects of traditional
status offense legislation. The category is ambiguous, impractical, and out of place in legislation otherwise generally commendable for its reforms. The legislature can improve its new juvenile
laws by applying a consistently progressive approach to its status
offense legislation. It should repeal the anachronistic dependency
provisions. It should make temporary residential care and alternative residential placement hearings available to all runaways,
not just those police apprehend. Finally, the legislature should
enact legislation and appropriate sufficient funds to ensure the
provision of emergency medical and mental health treatment to
runaways who need it. These changes would eliminate anomalies
in the present laws and complete Washington's ambitious reform
of its status offense legislation.
Thomas Neville

